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THE RIGHT TO A DECENT ENVIRONMENT;
E =MC: ENVIRONMENT EQUALS MAN
TIMES COURTS REDOUBLING
THEIR EFFORTS
E. F. Robertst
Innovation... is called for if the rules are to remain appropriate
to the activities they govern. But, as the conservative understands it,
modification of the rules should always reflect, and never impose,
a change in the activities and beliefs of those who are subject to
them, and should never on any occasion be so great as to destroy
the ensemble. Consequently, the conservative will have nothing to
do with innovations designed to meet merely hypothetical situa-
tions; . . .he will be suspicious . .. of Saviors of Society who
buckle on armour and seek dragons to slay; ... in short, he will
be disposed to regard politics as an activity in which a valuable
set of tools is renovated from time to time and kept in trim rather
than as an opportunity for perpetual re-equipment.
-Michael Oakeshott1
I
ANATOMY OF A NUISANCE CASE
Qualified officials of New York's State Air Resources Board say
its budget of $2-million and staff of 185 are less than adequate.
Some courts make abatement difficult. The operation of an Albany
cement plant that showers dust on the surrounding countryside was
defended by a judge as important to the regional economy.
-Gladwin Hill2
A. A Nuisance Brawl: Rounds One and Two
Let us talk about the recent case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co.3 The plaintiffs there brought an action seeking to enjoin a cement
company "from emitting dust and raw materials and conducting exces-
sive blasting in operating its plant."4 In substance, plaintiffs were seek-
j- Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1952, Northeastern University; LL.B.
1954, Boston College.
1" M. OAKEsHOTT, RATIONALISM AND PoLITIcs AND OTHER EssAYs 190-91 (1962).
2 Hill, Air Pollution Grows Despite Rising Public Alarm, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1969,
at 61, col. 3.
3 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294
N.Y.S.2d 452 (3d Dep't 1968).
4 55 Misc. 2d at 1024, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
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ing to enjoin what they saw as a nuisance. But allow the trial judge
to describe the alleged culprit:
Atlantic commenced the production of Portland Cement at its
plant in the Town of Coeymans in the County of Albany on or
about September 1, 1962. Prior to that date defendant expended
more than $40,000,000 in the erection of one of the largest and
most modem cement plants in the world. The company installed
at great expense the most efficient devices available to prevent the
discharge of dust and polluted air into the atmosphere.5
Be that as it may, the trial judge did find that Atlantic "created a
nuisance insofar as the lands of the plaintiffs [were] concerned."' He
also found that whereas plaintiffs' lands previously ranged in value from
$22,000 to $140,000, they now were worth a fraction less than half
their previous values. Indeed, the trial judge saw that the solution to
the problem lay in awarding plaintiffs the diminution in value of
their properties.
Why should the trial court have allowed the cement company, in
empirical effect, to buy up its neighbors? In Whalen v. Union Bag &
Paper Co.,7 cited by the trial judge,8 the New York Court of Appeals
reinstated an injunction against a million-dollar pulp mill that had
polluted a stream, after an intermediate court had substituted damages
for the injunction, because the highest court would not accept the
idea that interests should be balanced in nuisance cases. Such a doc-
trine, after all, "if followed to its logical conclusion .. would deprive
the poor litigant of his little property by giving it to those already
rich."0
Be that as it may, listen to the trial court in the instant case: "The
ownership of property will be protected unless there are other con-
siderations."'01 What could these other considerations be?
If the protection of a legal right even would do a plaintiff but
comparatively little good and would produce great public or private
hardship, equity will withhold its discreet and beneficent hand and
remit the plaintiff to his legal rights and remedies."
The language, however, was quoted from the Court of Appeals's deci-
5 Id.
6 Id., 287 N.YS.2d at 114.
7 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1918).
8 55 Misc. 2d at 1025, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
9 208 N.Y. at 5, 101 N.E. at 806.
10 55 Misc. 2d at 1025, 287 N.YS.2d at 114 (emphasis added).
11 Id.
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sion in McCann v. Chasm Power Co., 12 the effect of which was to place
New York back in the column of those jurisdictions which did agree
that, at least in certain cases, the poor litigant could be coerced off
his property.
How then were the interests to be balanced in Boomer? Nine
parcels of land, once worth $346,000 in the aggregate, were worth
$161,000 after the cement plant began operating. Still, balanced against
this were the palpable facts of the "defendant's immense investment in
the Hudson River Valley, its contribution to the Capital District's
economy and its immediate help to the education of children in the
Town of Coeymans through the payment of substantial sums in school
and property taxes ... ."13 This said, the scales were found to weigh
more heavily in favor of the cement plant, contributor to local affluence,
than in favor of the several properties inundated by the sound and
stench of progress.
How did the neighboring property owners fare when they ap-
pealed? Suffice it to report that they lost.' 4 Even so, the terse
opinion of the appellate tribunal interpolates into this scenario three
ideas that cloud the waters sufficiently to justify running that opinion
through an intellectual filter in order to assay its merits. These three
ideas are simple enough to set out. First, balancing the equities is a
fitting and proper way to try a nuisance case.' 5 Second, the fact that
the company used the "most modern and efficient devices to prevent
offensive emissions and discharges"'16 was determinative of something
or other. Third, the zoning of the area, first alluded to by the appellate
tribunal, was determinative of something or other.17 Lest the reader
think that I am being jocose when I raise doubts about what precisely
the company's technology and the zoning map determined, taken into
account along with the relative size of the investments by the parties
and the company's sizeable tax bill, let the reader note that the appel-
late tribunal based its result upon "all of these relevant factors.' 18
B. A Post-Fight Critique
Hornbook law insists that New York is numbered among those
few states that abide by "the rule" that injunctive relief will be refused
12 211 N.Y. 301, 305, 105 N.E. 416, 417 (1914).
13 55 Misc. 2d at 1025, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
14 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452 (3d Dep't
1968).
15 Id. at 481, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
16 1d.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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if the offending use is one permitted by a zoning ordinance.19 New York
courts, however, have enjoined funeral parlors even though they were a
permitted use according to the zoning map.20 Boome" is interesting,
therefore, because the trial court refused to enjoin the activity after
balancing the interests involved, and the appellate tribunal, affirming
the accuracy of the balance struck below, cited the zoning law only as
one of the several factors to be weighed when considering whether to
enjoin an obnoxious activity. The internal logic of the case evidences
that the so-called New York rule may verbalize only the high prob-
ability, rather than the compulsive necessity, that a court will not
enjoin as a nuisance a use permitted by the zoning law.
If still more changes in New York jurisprudence are to be appre-
ciated, Boomer should be compared with Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke
Corp.,21 a case often cited in support of the New York rule. In Bove
the unfortunate plaintiff had moved into a section of Buffalo that,
because of the influence of transportation factors, was bound to grow
into an industrial sector.22 The inevitable occurred and plaintiff found
herself inundated by soot and fumes from a new coke plant. Plaintiff
got neither injunctive relief nor damages. Apart from the fact that
the area was by then zoned to allow coke ovens, the court refused relief
because the defendant's plant was not a nuisance. This was so because
the plant represented the best effort achievable under the technology
of the day and, perforce, it was not defendant's "fault" that the in-
stallation polluted the local environment.
Arguably, however, modem courts have discarded the notion that
nuisance must involve a faulty manufacturing operation.2 8 Instead,
these courts will enjoin the most technologically advanced operation if
it is sited in the wrong place.24 Site selection is the whole key. That is,
a plant that spews pollution when technology could reasonably prevent
19 E.g., Note, Zoning Ordinances and Common-Law Nuisance, 16 SmAcusE L. REv.
860, 861 (1965).
20 Sweet v. Campbell, 282 N.Y, 146, 25 N.E.2d 963 (1940).
21 286 App. Div. 87, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (4th Dep't 1982).
22 Id. at 41, 258 N.Y.S. at 234:
The land is low and lies adjacent to the Buffalo river, a navigable stream con-
necting with Lake Erie. Seven different railroads run through this area ...
Railroads naturally follow the low levels in passing through a city. Cheap trans-
portation is an attraction which always draws factories and industrial plants to a
locality. It is common knowledge that a combination of rail and water terminal
facilities will stamp a section as a site suitable for industries of the heavier type,
rather than for residential purposes.
23 See, e.g., Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases,
1955 Wis. L. REv. 440. Compare Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun 565 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888),
with McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907).
24 E.g., McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907).
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it is everywhere a nuisance in the old-fashioned sense and should be
enjoinable even in New York. A plant that spews pollution but is the
best plant reasonably possible according to modem technological think-
ing is a nuisance only if it is sited in the wrong part of town, such as
a residential area. What New York did in Bove was to simplify the deci-
sion about site selection by purporting to make the zoning map, if any,
conclusive.
Boomer raises the quaere whether New York has retreated from
its old rule and replaced it with a rule that a properly run plant, which
nonetheless pollutes, can be enjoined as a nuisance notwithstanding its
being a permitted user according to zoning. Let us rehearse this sug-
gestion as if the law were logic. According to classic nuisance law a
non-negligently run plant is not a nuisance if correctly sited. In New
York, according to Bove, plaintiff had to bear the loss caused by pro-
gress under this last statement. Presumably, the same was true in
Boomer, yet in Boomer the plaintiffs were given money damages. If,
however, the plant was up to par technologically, the damages could
not be justified according to classic nuisance law, because no nuisance
existed.25 Ergo, the damages had to be based upon the modem idea
that something was amiss in the site, which perforce means that zoning
law was de-emphasized as the sole criterion of that question. In logic,
therefore, if the zoning map is not conclusive, then even in New York
a court might enjoin a technologically-par plant in an area zoned to
receive it. Logic, however, is not necessarily law.
It is doubtful whether New York thinking about injunctions has
changed. What has changed is thinking about the allocation of losses
attributable to industrialization of a neighborhood. Whereas at the
time of Bove it was self-evident that, without fault, loss should fall
on the innocent victim of circumstances, by the time of Boomer it
may be subconsciously axiomatic that losses should be spread over the
consumer-beneficiaries of changing circumstances that harm innocent
bystanders.28 If so, Boomer reflects an application of modem consumer
liability thinking to the area of nuisance law. Thus the New York
rule turns out to be that, although a technologically-par plant will
not be enjoined in an area wherein it is a permitted user, the plant
nonetheless will be assessed for any resulting diminution in value of
the surrounding properties. The industrial entrepreneurs are not at
fault either in the way they operated the installation or in the way
25 E.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
28 See cases collected in Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing
Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 849-56 (1967).
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they selected the site; rather, the contemporary sense of justice simply
decrees that they, and through them their customers, should bear the
losses occasioned the neighborhood by the plant.
Thus it is that the law in New York falls into line with that old
chestnut, Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. 27 There
plaintiffs owned farms with an aggregate assessed value of less than
one thousand dollars. Defendants were two great mining and manufac-
turing enterprises worth nearly two million dollars, representing half
of the taxable values in the county.28 Defendants reduced their copper
ore by cooking it over open-air wood fires, emitting large volumes of
sulphur dioxide smoke and turning the valley into a wasteland. The
Tennessee court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive
relief because "the law must make the best arrangement it can between
the contending parties, with a view to preserving to each one the largest
measure of liberty possible under the circumstances." 29 "Liberty" here
meant that the companies were free to create a wasteland if they paid
for it, whereas the farmers were free to take jobs with the industry and
continue to reside in a valley totally polluted with chemicals.
II
NUISANCE LAW EQUALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
We may have even less than a 50-50 chance of living until 1980.
-Daniel Moynihan3O
In a corrupted age the putting the world in order would breed
confusion.
-The First Marquess of Halifax8'
27 115 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
28 Id. at 343, 83 S.W. at 660.
29 Id. at 367, 83 S.W. at 667.
3o The Times (London), Oct. 22, 1969, at 5, col. 3. Moynihan here may be overdoing
it in order to get some action going. Then again there is a streak of pessimism, or maybe
a civilized sense of original sin, in Moynihan. Thus he quotes approvingly Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr.'s depiction of the increment of sadness inherent in John F. Kennedy's
intellectual make-up: "I believe today that its basic source may have been an acute and
anguished sense of the fragility of the membranes of civilization.... [H]e had peered into
the abyss and knew the potentiality of chaos." D. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUI FEASIBLE MIS-
UNDERSTANDING 193 (1969), quoting A. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THoUSAND DAYS (1965).
Moynihan is, however, faithfully reproducing (or originating?) his master's voice.
Witness President Nixon's New Year's Day comment about the need to face the problems
posed by a deteriorating environment: "The nineteen-seventies absolutely must be the
years .... It is literally now or never." N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
31 HAxFAx, Co pszmr WoRxs 231 (J. Kenyon ed. 1969). In the "it's a small world"
category of intellectual gossip, it is interesting to observe that Moynihan has cited Michael
1970] E -- MC2
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A. Nuisance Law: Convergence with Constitutional Law
If one stops to think about it, the only thing the entrepreneurs
in Boomer did wrong was not to acquire enough land right away
around their plant to serve as a pollution catchment or buffer area.
This last sentence should instantly cause an intellectual bell to ring
in the back of any well-trained lawyer's mind because, indeed, it de-
scribes precisely the error attributed to the defendant in Griggs v.
Allegheny County.32 That case, it will be recalled, involved a claim by
way of inverse condemnation against airport authorities for having
taken a glide-path easement through a claimant's territory. Here then
is an interesting parallel well worth pursuing.
Consider the recent decision of Oregon's highest court in Thorn-
burg v. Port of Portland.38 That case similarly involved a claim by a
municipal airport's neighbors in inverse condemnation. This time,
however, the "taking" involved not a glide-path but the imposition of
a noise vector, which rendered plaintiffs' properties less habitable. The
court accepted the theory. True, the case did involve activity engaged
in by a governmental agency, but note carefully the similarity to
Boomer in that the wrong complained of consisted of taking a vector
or easement of noise over fee simples. Is not taking by the imposition
of a vector or easement to lay dust and spread noise across fee simples
the same kind of taking when done by a private company? Indeed,
in Boomer and Thornburg does not the law of nuisance merge with
the law of condemnation? In both instances injunctions are for prac-
tical reasons not to be had; just compensation must be made, how-
ever, for seizing the right to ruin the neighboring environment. 84
If in Boomer and Thornburg we are dealing with essentially the
Oakeshott (note I supra) and, noting that Oakeshott succeeded to Harold Laski's chair,
suggested that this event is as good a symbol as any that there has been a turning away
from "received liberalism." D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 80, at 8. Illustrative that "the law"
is not the only "seamless web," it is noteworthy that Oakeshott in turn citeS Halifax,
criticizing him for even tentatively attempting to convert the informal art of politics
into a rationalist-style ideology. M. OAxIsnorr, supra note 1, at 21.
82 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
83 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). Interestingly enough, Senator Robert W. Pack-
wood has said that "'[t]he voters of Oregon will no longer accept an economic justification
for pollution.. . . They won't stand for a factory polluting a river even if it involves 500
jobs.'" N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1969, at 78, col. 8 (city ed.).
34 In fact, this convergence of nuisance and condemnation thinking has not escaped
notice, witness the dissent in Thornburg, wherein objection was taken to "commingling
the remedies afforded under the law of eminent domain and nuisance." 238 Ore. at 213,
376 P.2d at 116. Conversely, the majority opinion noted that a nuisance might ripen
into a prescriptive easement to lay noise across a neighboring fee. Id. at 183.84 & n.3,
376 P.2d at 102-03 & n..
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same wrong, committed by a private company in one instance and
by an agency of government in the other, an interesting idea intrudes
itself. Boomer should be read as a case wherein, because the court
refused to issue an injunction, a private company was allowed to
condemn an easement or vector in neighboring land, The authority to
seize private property, however, belongs to the instrumentalities of
government, whether federal, state, or local, and has not been asso-
ciated with private agencies. Arguably, therefore, the Boomer case is
wrong on constitutional grounds. That is, whenever a nuisance amounts
to what would constitute a "taking" if the offender were a government
agency, the courts must enjoin the wrong because the award of damages
would confer upon private offenders the ultra vires-like authority to
condemn interests in land, not indeed for a public purpose, but for
their private advantage.
"For Heaven's sake," will cry many a reader at this point, "such
an argument would bring the economy to a screeching halt." True, it
may be a bit late in the game now to undo the private takings thus
far countenanced under the disguise of nuisance doctrine, but what is
wrong with a court adopting this theory prospectively? 5
For the time being, let us assume that the rule we propose only
applies in future cases. In terms of the conventional wisdom contained
in affluence-oriented economics, we still have committed grievous error
because the threat of an injunction, or the costs of purchasing an
injunction-proof buffer area, will inhibit expansion. The crucial point,
which must affect anyone's decision whether to accept this inhibition,
is whether or not industrial expansion promises, if unchecked, to pol-
lute the whole environment to such a degree that the resultant affluence
proves to be a fleeting denouement before Judgment Day. The question
before the house, therefore, is whether we can afford further industrial
expansion without real environmental controls or whether we must
attempt to impose new controls on future expansion to prevent its
potential deleterious impact upon environment.
True, there are various legislative remedies on the books that,
if enforced, promise us a clean environment sometime in the future.36
85 W. LEACH, PRoPERTY LAw INDim-rm 24 (1967): "In summary, it is now clear that
any court can change bad law into good without looking over its shoulder at the possible
repercussions on prior transactions, by the device of prospective-only overruling." Better
yet, the Court could suggest that the nuisance ruling might have to be made retrospective
if the situation was not bettered with "all due deliberate speed." Compare Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 US. 483 (1954), with Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of EdUc,, 396 U.S.
19 (1969) (per curiam).
s3 But see Hill, Air Pollution Grows Despite Rising Public Alarm, N.Y. Times, Oct.
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Be that as it may, let the reader's recollection be refreshed by recalling
for him several palpable facts which are, or ought to be, common
knowledge. Anyone who has flown into New York City during the right
weather situation can taste the local pollution problem. Anyone who
has flown over Buffalo can see industrial smoke drifting thirty or forty
miles, either out over Lake Erie or inland over beautifully green
countryside. Detroit not only looks like a red, dust-enveloped metro-
polis, it is an environment enveloped in a dust dome. Hence, whereas
political or legislative processes may promise relief after enough lives
have been lost to demand that affluence-oriented conventional wisdom
be curtailed, every man meanwhile must look to the courts to provide
an immediate remedy for his environmental complaints.
If, therefore, the reader decides that a stop must be put to increas-
ing pollution, the injunctive process promises a first effective step in
this direction. There is, frankly, no way to prove intellectually whether
this new rule of preventing private "takings" is "right" or "wrong";
instead, the real question is whether, given the reader's sense of what is
fitting and proper, it is the "appropriate" or "inappropriate" response
to an ever-exacerbating conundrum.
B. An Admixture of Socialism and Participatory Democracy
What if a municipality finds that it needs a new source of cement
but that no manufacturer can amass the land necessary to insulate the
new plant from its neighbors? The answer is elementary, although it
requires a radical re-allocation of the relative decision-making authority
between government and the dictates of the market. Whereas in the
past zoning channelled development in the hopes of reducing the in-
crement of nuisance-style friction between neighbors, local government
in the future would have to select and condemn sites for and, perforce,
determine the number of pollution-causing industries that could locate
themselves in the area. Instead of being concerned merely with chan-
nelling market-dictated development, local government would have to
concern itself not merely with planning of the land-use variety but with
overall economic planning as well. 37 On the one hand, this would sim-
19, 1969, at 1, col. 3: "As America's air becomes steadily more contaminated, activities
across the nation to cope with smog appear to be lagging further and further behind actual
needs despite a rising public clamor for improvement." The graphs illustrating Mr. Hill's
article seem to substantiate his opening grabber. Id. at 61, cols. 2-3.
37 Whether market decisions should retain their central position on the city scene is
still a question, witness this colloquy about the proposed Model Land Development Code:
[PROFESSOR E. F. ROBERTS:] ... Allison, you have been through this
with me before. Is it fair to assume that the marketplace is the ultimate deter-
mination of development? And from my rather socialist planning background,
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ply allow the voters more voice in selecting their planners, since markets
are already fairly well-planned by private forces or by Washington.38
On the other hand, where industry required vast spaces to provide the
requisite buffer zone, we should see exclusively residential suburban
rings around center city shattered by the compulsive force to locate
new industry.8 9 Obviously, an industry which could not contain its
pollutant by-products within a feasible area should not be built.
will your Code inhibit, for example, municipal planning by way of condemning
the right to development on the periphery of the municipality? Does it inhibit
piece by piece development decisions by a wheeling and dealing governmental
unit?
DIRECTOR WECHSLER: If you understand the question, will you please
answer it? [Laughter]
PROFESSOR DUNHAM: The question refers to planning Chicago style.
I think he means: Is this based on the economic theories of Milton Friedman at
the University of Chicago, the great classical economist?
To state my own personal opinion, I would be proud to say that I do share
the classical economist's view that, by and large, the best decisions are made by
the private owner, and that I, to the extent that I have controlled this structure-
why, it does have that emphasis.
Now, Mr. Roberts is correct that there are other ways of securing adoption
of the plan, or approval of the plan. It is possible, assuming there is enough
money to do it . . . to buy all of the land in the community which is available
for development, and then sell it only to a developer who agrees to build in
accordance with the plan.
Now, what I'm trying to say on this, in answer to his specific question, is:
Do we permit a local government to buy the development rights on the outskirts
of the community? That is, say to the local owner: You may continue to use it
for what you are now using it for, but we have acquired from you an easement,
or a negative easement, which says you can't develop it without our consent?
That's permissible. It's permissible under much existing law. We merely set it
forth here in a much dearer form than it is now available. And as all of you
know who have worked with conservation, recreation, and open space, this is
occurring in many parts of the United States ....
45 ALI PROCEEDINGS 216-18 (1968).
The ALI Model Development Code that precipitated these remarks has been made
obsolete by New York's launching of its State Urban Development Corporation, a creature
which if implemented adequately will make the state the leader in future development
activity. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6251-$60 (McKinney Supp. 1969). See also the new
English scheme contained in the Land Commission Act of 1967, c. 1.
38 See materials collected in Roberts, A Eulogy For the Old Property, 20 MAINE
L. REV. 15, 39-41 (1968); Roberts, From Common Law Logic-Chopper to Land-Use Planner:
Eulogy for the Lawyer as Social Engineer, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 984-89 (1968). See also
G. MEANs, THE CORPORATE REvOLuTION IN AMmuCA 77 (1964).
So This, of course, would make units of local government significant power foci again,
which presumably would allow people a better sense of participating in or at least influenc-
ing decisions. See, e.g., Social Reform in the Centrifugal Society, NEnv SOCIErY, Sept. 11,
1969, at 387. Consider also the impact this restoration of real decision-making power at
the local level should have in another context:
Paul Goodman wrote his powerful tract Growing Up Absurd. Goodman an avowed
if doctrinally elusive radical-anarchist, if anything-was just then acquiring the
1970] E =MC2
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Immediately the careful reader must wonder whether the units of
local government, themselves the product of political and, perforce, self-
interested forces, can be expected to create a better environment or
whether, like the federal regulatory agencies, they will be captured by
industry and things will go on pretty much as they are.40 The obvious
answer is that, left to their own devices, local governments cannot be
expected to do one bit better. Still, because their land acquisition deci-
sions are susceptible to judicial review, there is hope now that they may
be coerced into living up to a better standard.
A case that every environmentalist should read and re-read is Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission.41 There
a federal agency licensed the Consolidated Edison Company of New
York to construct a pumped-storage, hydroelectric reservoir near
Storm King Mountain along the Hudson River. As anyone familiar
with the area is well aware, this is "an area of unique beauty and major
historical significance." 42 Two towns and a conservation group entered
the federal courts to seek a reversal of the agency decision on the ground
that the agency had not satisfied its statutory duty to consider the
impact the project would have upon the area The court agreed that the
agency had to think through the whole thing again, this time not merely
within the banal terms of cost-accounting, but in such a way that their
intellectual litmus tests included "a basic concern [for] the preservation
of natural beauty and of national historic shrines." 43 The court like-
wise agreed that the towns and the unincorporated association had
great influence among middle- and upper-class college youth that was to make
him in time a guru of the New Left in its special quest for participatory
democracy. But the striking quality of his thesis ... is its avowed and explicitly
conservative content. . . . [This] certainly required an outright rejection of
gigantism and a reversion to smaller units of society ....
D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 80, at 15-17.
In the short run, of course, suburban snobbery would likely resist industry, but the
rising costs of their sacrosanct schools would force suburbanites to expand their tax base
by letting in industry. Once the wedge is put in, hopefully some working class, ie., black,
housing must follow. See N.Y. Times, June 29, 1969, at 89, col. 1 (city ed.): "A lawsuit is
being prepared by two city planners to challenge the constitutionality of suburban zoning
laws....
The planners argue that . . . suburban zoning has made housing too expensive for
millions locked in the central cities .... - See also Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary
Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. RFV. 767 (1969).
40 See, e.g., Appendix containing Commissioner William M. Bennett's classic dissent
in California Public Utility Commission-on Application by Pacific Gas 9: Electric Co. for
a Nuclear Plant at Diablo Canyon.
41 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
42 Id. at 613.
43 Id. at 624.
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standing to enter the controversy, The court based this decision, in
part, on plaintiffs' economic interest in the area.44 More significantly,
the court explained that it decided the standing question as it did in
order "to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately
protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recrea-
tional aspects of power development." 45 Giving full weight to this
rationale, one can hopefully assume that any seriously interested group
of local citizens could have maintained the action and that the talk
about economic interest was merely a makeweight.
Hopefully, therefore, if units of local government exercise the
power of condemnation necessary to acquire reservations for pollution-
prone industries, they will be required to exhibit a concern for the
environment. We have no way of being certain, however, that any
enabling legislation conferring the necessary authority upon local gov-
ernment will require it to take into account either natural beauty or
historical significance in its site selection process. Thus the Achilles'
heel of our solution to the nuisance problem appears to lie in the
danger we pose to aesthetic values when we unleash local government
with this charge to acquire vast areas of unspoiled land.
The careful reader must observe yet another Achilles' heel in
the structure herein posited. True, neighbors inundated by dust could
enjoin the offender. True, local government should have to acquire the
land upon which to site these industries in order to prevent neighbor-
hood pollution by dust, smell, noise, or vibration. But what about an
industry whose by-product is an invisible gas so quickly absorbed in
the atmosphere that its effects, even though not readily measurable in
its immediate neighborhood, contribute to the toxic balance of the
regional atmosphere? Will a court enjoin under the theory propounded
here something that, although a menace to the whole region, does not
fall within the usual nuisance categories of smell, sound, or vibration
obnoxious to the immediate neighborhood? Concomitantly, given a
smoke-belching plant from which, because they are poor or indifferent,
the neighbors do not seek relief, are we certain that citizens outside
the neighborhood but within the region have the standing to sue in
their stead? Is there a broader community interest in the total environ-
ment that exceeds the right to be free from immediate neighboring
nuisances? In short, is there a general right to an environment fit to
sustain healthy human life?
44 Id, at 616.
45 Id.
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III
THE RIGHT TO AN ENVIRONMENT FIT TO SusTAIN HEALTHY
HUMAN LIFE
[In] our affluent society, the cost of a project is only one of several
factors to be considered.
-Judge Paul R. Hays46
A. A Political Response: Constitutional Amendments
The threat to environment posed by our current way of living
can quickly be gleaned from a recent report issued by the United
Nations:
Improved technology is necessary if productivity is to increase and
the products of industry be provided to growing numbers of people.
However, the side effects of poorly planned or uncontrolled indus-
trialization and of the one-sided application of technology have
been a direct cause of many serious environmental problems. Dur-
ing the discussions of the General Assembly at the twenty-third
session, it was pointed out that the reliance of modern technology
upon the combustion of fossil fuels has brought a 10 per cent in-
crease in atmospheric carbon dioxide over the past century. With
increased rates of combustion, this could rise to 25 per cent by
the year 2000 A.D. The consequences of such an increase upon
world weather and climate are uncertain, but could eventually be
catastrophic. The increased use of modern technology has brought
major increases in the amount of waste products which serve as
environmental pollutants. It has been stated that in the United
States of America alone, this amounts each year to 142 million tons
of smoke and noxious fumes, 7 million automobiles, 20 million tons
of paper, 48,000 million cans, 26,000 million bottles and jars,
3,000 million tons of waste rock and mill tailings and 50 trillion
gallons of hot water along with a variety of other waste products.
Other industrialized nations make their comparable contributions
of debris and toxic materials. While technology is adequate to
cope with these problems of pollution, the planning and applica-
tion of pollution control lags far behind what is required, often
due to economic considerations.47
Let the reader observe, by the way, that the very source of this report
illustrates that we Americans by no means have any monopoly of the
ability to destroy this planet.
Responding to this phenomenon, a number of amendments have
46 Id. at 624.
47 U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL, PROBLEMS OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, pt. 4, at 5
(1969).
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been introduced at the state level that would establish a right to en-
vironment. Typical of these, perhaps, is the following Pennsylvania
effort:
That article one of the Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania be amended by adding at the end thereof, a new
section to read:
Section 27. Natural Resources and the Public Estate.-The
people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation
of the natural scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environ-
ment. Pennsylvania's natural resources, including the air, waters,
fish, wildlife, and the public lands and property of the Common-
wealth, are the common property of all the people, including gen-
erations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Common-
wealth shall preserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people.48
The question, naturally enough, is whether these provisions, however
commendable, are a response adequate to the threat posed.
The immediate objection to be voiced against such a fiat is that
it is so broad that most lawyers may not know precisely what they are
to make of it. No one will deny that people have an abstract right to
clean air and historic values, but how are these to be translated into
legally enforceable rights? Preserving historic buildings, for example, is
a field in its own right fraught with immense complexities. 49 Various
efforts have already been initiated, moreover, to clean up the air.50 What
precisely are the courts to do?
Within academia it is easy to suggest to the Pennsylvania courts
that they issue mandatory injunctions in any case where air or water
pollution is proved; this is what the amendment authorizes them to do.
What, however, if the Pennsylvania judges were to use the injunctive
process to dean up that Commonwealth in short order, but Delaware,
for example, did not pursue a similar course? Should we not shortly see
a superb but bankrupt Pennsylvania and an even more affluent, albeit
doomed in the long range, Delaware, as industry migrated there? Given
man's preference to enjoy his cakes and ale now, the answer to this
question is self-evident. In short, the several state courts, acting indi-
vidually, would be faced with the same policy problems that have be-
leaguered state legislatures in our multi-state system.
It would require a unique state court willing to upset radically
the local economy to take an amendment of this type at face value.
48 Pa. H.R. 958 (1969).
49 See, e.g., J. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (1965).
so E.g., Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (Supp. IV, 1969).
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Further, if it meant destroying the local economy and plunging the
state into a clean agrarian past, no judge could in conscience implement
an amendment like this. Predictably, judges will reason that this kind
of amendment is not self-executing. That is, rather than creating a
new rule of substantive law, such an amendment will most likely be
interpreted to authorize the state legislature to enact legislation to bet-
ter the environment along with the health, safety, and morals of its
citizens. To translate this phenomenon into the terms of a monopoly
game, in substance we should still be at "go."
Earlier we suggested that the old nuisance remedy could acquire
a wholly new significance if it received a transfusion of constitutional
law thinking. Here we have seen that any right to an environment
suitable for human habitation must be something applicable equally
to all of the states lest laggard jurisdictions benefit economically from
the reforms imposed elsewhere. An effort at the federal level appears
to be the only answer. For reasons that will be made manifest later, a
political response at the federal level does not hold much promise. A
fortiori, we must inquire whether the Supreme Court of these United
States can with propriety declare that a right exists whereby every
citizen can demand an environment capable of sustaining decent human
life.
B. A Judicial Response: Substantive Due Process Revisited
When I took a course in constitutional law, "judicial restraint"
was the keystone in the intellectual arch of conventional wisdom. In-
deed, students looking for an easy crutch used to waste their time
memorizing Mr. Justice Brandeis's inventory of reasons why the Court
would not take a case. 51 Training like this made it difficult indeed for
a whole generation of lawyers to adjust themselves to accept the so-
called "activist" Warren Court. We had to come to accept the idea
that although it was "bad" for the New Deal Court to strike down
federal and state economic and welfare legislation, that did not mean
that the Warren Court should similarly restrain itself when it came to
handling civil rights cases.
Concomitantly, I also learned that "due process" meant procedural
due process and that any notion of "substantive due process" was
anathema. My bible was the Holmes version, and the text was found
in the book of Lochner v. New York: "The Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."' 52 That is, in
51 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
52 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
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reviewing legislation enacted under the police power, judges should
not impose upon the question what they think the lawmakers should
have done. Instead, judges should first ask themselves whether the
measure is directed toward achieving an end properly the business of
government: to-wit, does it purport to regulate the public health,
safety, or morals? If the answer is affirmative, are the means adopted to
achieve the end such that a reasonable legislator could believe them
fitting and proper? If the answer again is affirmative, that is the
end of the business.
My generation's repose was shattered again when the Watren
Court came to deal with the problem raised in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.1 There, it will be recalled, two defendants, one an officer of the
Planned Parenthood League and the other a licensed physician and
Yale professor, were convicted of violating Connecticut statutes making
it a crime to give instructions on birth control techniques even to mar-
ried couples. According to the conventional wisdom that had existed
since New Deal days, there was little the Court could do to change
the result. The right to disseminate birth control information is no-
where inventoried in the list of rights rendered explicit in the Bill
of Rights, so no such right was channelled through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment into Connecticut's jurisprudence.
Judicial restraint, moreover, clearly indicated that the Court had no
business striking down a state measure regulating health, safety, and
morals simply because the judges did not agree with the wisdom behind
the enactment.
Indeed, my generation must have nodded in total agreement as
they read in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Black the following:
The Due Process Clause with an "arbitrary and capricious" or
"shocking to the conscience" formula was liberally used by this
Court to strike down economic legislation in the early decades of
this century, threatening, many people thought, the tranquility
and stability of the Nation. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York ....
That formula, based on subjective considerations of "naturaljustice," is no less dangerous when used to enforce this Court's
views about personal rights than those about economic rights.
I had thought we had laid that formula, as a means for striking
down state legislation, to rest once and for all .... 5-
Unfortunately for our peace of mind, Mr. Justice Black had to express
our conventional wisdom in a dissenting opinion.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in explaining why the statutes were void,
63 381 Us. 479 (1965).
54 Id. at 522 (dissenting opinion).
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managed to avoid literally invoking the old litany of substantive due
process by discovering a right of privacy in the Bill of Rights which,
obviously, the Connecticut legislature could not invade. Finding a
zone of privacy protected by the Bill of Rights was no easy task since
privacy is nowhere mentioned therein. Still, although the first amend-
ment protects freedom of speech and religion, it does not explicitly
guarantee anyone the right to send his children to parochial instead of
public schools. This does not prevent the Court from striking down
an effort by a state to coerce children into the public schools on the
ground that such a measure violates the first amendment.5 5 Thus each
of the specific rights listed in the Bill of Rights has "penumbras . . .
that help give them life and substance."'56 Similarly, the first amend-
ment's rights to enjoy freedom of speech and religion include "the
privacy" of one's associations in the sense that a state cannot demand
membership lists from legitimate groups.5 7 The third amendment is
concerned with privacy when it forbids unconsented-to quartering of
soldiers in private houses during peacetime. The fourth amendment's
concern with searches obviously includes a notion of privacy, as does
the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause. If this was not enough,
the ninth amendment warns us that the enumeration of some rights
in the previous amendments must not be construed to deny the exis-
tence of "others retained by the people."55s Privacy, therefore, is im-
minent within the penumbras surrounding several amendments, and
in the interstices wherein these several penumbras overlap, there is
authority for the proposition that the Bill of Rights did create a right
of marital privacy so fundamental that the Connecticut statutes had to
be declared unconstitutional.
One can retain a pretty skeptical attitude about "the law" laid
down in Griswold. Arguably, the Court acted only because the Con-
necticut legislature and courts lacked the courage to face up to what
they calculated would be a Roman Catholic voters' backlash. Further,
one can suspect that all of the talk about privacy was a smokescreen to
disguise the fact that the Court was not using the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause as a channel through which the Bill of Rights
55 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
56 281 U.S. at 484.
57 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
58 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IX. Professor Bork has objected that to read the ninth amend-
ment to mean that the Bill of Rights is an open-ended set of principles "has revolutionary
implications for the practice of judicial review." Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New
Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1969, at 138, 170. At the same time he admits that there is
"some historical evidence that this is substantially what Madison intended." Id.
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was applied to the state, but rather had given the due process clause a
heavy transfusion in its own right of what the majority considered was
natural justice. In short, as Mr. Justice Black noted, the case revived
substantive due process.
If, however, there is a great deal to be said for the Warren Court's
activism, there may also be something to be said in favor of a new
form of substantive due process. Along the lines of the tactic employed
in Griswold, there already exists the conceptual raw materials out of
which a natural justice-style right to an environment fit for human
habitation might be constructed. Implicit in the fifth amendment, after
all, is the notion that human life is sacrosanct. Manifestly, the ninth
amendment confirms the self-evident truth that the people did not
surrender their expectation that they should be free to live in a decent
environment. Indeed, the recognition that there is a constitutional right
to a decent environment would simply mandate a return to adherence
to first principles in a society founded not merely to guarantee "Liberty"
but to preserve "Life ... and the pursuit of Happiness."5 9 Thus we
stand marking time, anticipating a moment when the environment de-
teriorates to such a point that the Court is compelled to confirm that,
along with free speech and religion, there exists a right to an environ-
ment fit for human habitation.
C. The Import of Such a Judicial Declaration
What if the Court should declare that there does exist for each
and every citizen a constitutional right to a decent environment? The
plain fact of the matter is that we should not enter upon any Utopian
uplands tomorrow. The notion that we should suddenly see the use
of automobiles enjoined, power plants shut down, and jet aircraft
grounded is patently absurd. However much we protest, none of us
is willing to return to the agrarian past.
At best we only can expect that the Court would require, via a
series of procedural due process cases, that all governmental agencies
give sufficient weight to the substantive right to a decent environment
whenever they make a decision. Thus the decision would run the
gamut from the Federal Power Commission to an upstate village board
enacting a master plan. In short, the approach demanded by the court
in Scenic Hudson would be elevated to a constitutional norm. Con-
comitantly, standing to appear at hearings and before the courts should
be broadened so that representatives of the public affected by decisions
59 Declaration of Independence, 1776.
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may freely enter the lists to assert the rights of the public.60 Hopefully,
therefore, if the various regulatory agencies stop to look and listen
to the wisdom being collected under the title of human ecology, we
should see a gradual trend of decision making accelerating eventually
into a decline of the pollution curve.
It must be recalled, however, that the Court would have several
trump cards to play should the several agencies tarry. The Court might
invoke the injunctive approach to nuisance cases suggested earlier.
The Court might decide to ban the internal combustion engine "with
all due deliberate speed." The point, as the reader must now begin to
suspect, is that no one can predict what should result from such a
declaration of constitutional content, simply because lack of Linus
blanket-style certainty is the essence of a common law approach. Just
like the destruction of the status quo wrought by Brown v. Board of
Education,"' and like the excursion in the "political thicket" symbolized
by Baker v. Carr,62 this approach will also demand a long, gruelling
campaign of difficult decisions to give content to the original declara-
tion. However, the crisis looms so large that, just as war is too serious
a business to be left to the generals, our environment has become too
serious a subject to be left to the politicians.
IV
FURTHER OBSERVATIONS
As mankind is made, the keeping it in order is an ill-natured office.
-The First Marquess of Halifax 63
A. Dictum
There are still deeper waters involved here than we might expect.
Ours is a society obsessed with planning so long as planning does not
entail a socialist-style government monopolizing the planning function.
Hence our conventional wisdom envisages cooperation between govern-
60 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966), is most significant in this regard. There representatives of "listener
interest" were held entitled to participate in an administrative hearing in order to
question the objectivity of a local broadcaster when its license came up for renewal. The
decision was written by the then Judge Warren E. Burger. For further comments on this
point, see Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideo-
logical Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968); Reich, The Law of the Planned Society,
75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
61 347 US. 483 (1954).
62 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
68 HAIrAx, supra note 31, at 203.
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ment and business in the planning process. Still, there is a sense in
which this consensus-oriented alliance amounts to a corporate-socialist
establishment so all-pervasive and all-powerful that the individual citi-
zen senses that he is helpless to influence the decisions being made
which affect him. His air may be polluted, his water poisoned, his
food contaminated; and yet no one in power seems to respond to the
citizen's sense that "something" is wrong with "the system." Little
wonder then that even this middle class is learning to take to the
streets.
6 4
Our political system was not responsive to the race problem. Sim-
ilarly, the system did not respond to gerrymandering even when
agrarian forms had become patently absurd in an urban era. The state
legislatures were not successful in solving the gigantic problem posed by
human injuries attributable to the increasing glut of consumer prod-
ucts. In each instance the judges responded. In each instance, moreover,
it can be argued that these decisions were substantially "conservative"
decisions because they were designed to adapt traditional notions of
justice to changed conditions. 5 They were "radical" only in the sense
that, when neither of the other two branches of government would or
could act, the Court risked losing its charisma as a non-political institu-
tion in order to restructure certain aspects of the traditional scene so
as to maintain the capacity of the Republic's political machinery to
respond appropriately to the contemporary milieu.
"Restructuring" is not, however, really the right word to apply
to what the Court has been about. Rather than restructuring, which
hints these days at tearing down a house without a fixed plan indicating
how to rebuild it, a more apt word would be remodeling. Just as
when one remodels, he retains the overall structure but substitutes new
parts for old, the Court has retained the basic grundnorms of the Con-
stitution intact. Indeed, just as remodeling envisages a better but still
familiar house, the Court has improved the constitutional matrix by
forcing us to adhere to its real spirit.
64 Reich, supra note 60, has collected some examples of this new propensity in his
article. Id. at 1227-28. This phenomenon has not escaped the attention of Herbert Marcuse:
No matter how remote from these notions the rebellion may be, no matter
how destructive and self-destructive it may appear, no matter how great the
distance between the middle-class revolt in the metropoles and the life-and-death
struggle of the wretched of the earth-common to them is the depth of the refusal.
It makes them reject the rules of the game that is rigged against them, the ancient
strategy of patience and persuasion, the reliance on the Good Will in the Estab-
lishment, its false and immoral comforts, its cruel affluence.
H. MARCUsE, AN ESSAY ON LmERATION 6 (1969).
65 E.g., Roberts & Shultz, The Reapportionment Cases: Cognitive Lag, the Malady
and Its Cure, 27 U. Prrl. L. Rzv. 633, 647-49 (1966).
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This constitutional right to a decent environment, moreover, is
not a major breakthrough and in no way detracts from the need in
our society to concoct political solutions to a myriad of other problems
running the gamut from adequate housing and full employment to
population control and the new morality. If we allow the environment
to become uninhabitable, then we shall have rendered absurd all of
our other efforts. Thus we can justify our concern with environment
within a purely existential philosophy without the need to resort to
the occultism inherent in natural law reasoning. Indeed, this right is
simply a form of insurance policy affording us some promise that, if
we can respond to the other conundrums facing us by the year 2000,
the Republic will still be a place worth living in.
B. Obiter Dictum
When the establishment of its day promulgated Quia Emptores,
little did it anticipate that it was contributing to the collapse of the
feudal system. Still, from a high-water mark in 1290 the system gradu-
ally ran down hill until the coup de grdce was delivered in 1660 by
removal of the last incident of wardship and marriage from the shoul-
ders of the landed classes in England.66 True enough, the "squire to
all intents and purposes, owned his land; but the survival of the pay-
ments of feudal incidents kept alive the theory that the land really
belonged to the king."0 7 Thus it was that from "this time on, one can
more properly refer to landowners instead of simply landholders."68
Moreover, whereas feudalism saw government and the economy as just
so many facets of a unitary system ordered around property, government
after 1290 emerged in its own right and commerce began to blossom
in its own sphere distinct from landholding.69
66 Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. II, c. 24, 1 ENG. REv. STAT. 725 (1660).
67 W. HALL 9- R. ALBION, A HIStORy or ENGLAND AND THE BRInS EMPiRE 879 (2d
ed. 1946).
68 Id. This is a bit of an oversimplification. The Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. II,
c. 24, 1 ENG. REv. STAT. 725 (1660), abolished military tenures and converted them into
socage tenures, to which wardship and marriage had never applied. Socage duties involving
the performance of agricultural services had already been commuted into fixed rents,
which
when they were originally fixed, no doubt represented the economic value of the
land, yet with the gradual fall in the value of money . . . became in course of
time so insignificant in amount as not to be worth the trouble of collection.
G. CHEsHiE, THE MODERN LAw OF PROPERTY 21-22 (8th ed. 1958). See also 1 F. POLLOCK
&. F. MArrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAw 272-76 (2d ed. 1911). Still, in theory, and some-
times in practice, presumably, some "owners" after 1660 owed rent to their "lords" and,
until 1926, the land might escheat to the lord. G. CHEsnlaE, supra at 26.
69 As might be expected, someone would have to replace the revenues lost to the
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The period 1688-89 is crucial because it marks the establishment
of a new social order which had been gradually replacing the feudal
one. The Glorious Revolution did not involve just another displace-
ment of a monarch as celebrated in Shakespeare's Age of Kings. Parlia-
mentary supremacy had come into its own, and it marked a victory for
the proponents of a new conventional wisdom who believed that com-
merce was an activity to be insulated from governmental control and
was more properly regulated by its own natural laws.70 Adam Smith's
Crown when feudal dues ended. As it was, an excise tax was levied on "beere or ale ...
sider and perry." 12 Car. II, c. 24, 1 ENG. R.EV. STAT. 725, 729 (1660):
Bee it therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid that there shall be paid
unto the Kings Majestie his heires and successors for ever hereafter in recompence
as aforesaid the several rates impositions dutyes and charge herein after ex-
pressed and in manner and forme following (that is to say)
For every barrell of beere or ale above six shillings the barrell brewed by
the common brewer, or any other person or persons who doth or shall sell, or
tap out beere or ale publiquely or privately to be paid by the common brewer,
or by such other person or persons respectively, and soe proportionably for a
greater or lesser quantity, one shilling three pence ....
Id.
Quaere: Has legislative draftsmanship advanced all that much since the year 1660?
Speaking of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one author had this to say:
England during this period was . . . passing through a crisis of political,
social, and economic change. The old self-sufficing agricultural and industrial
economy of England, based on custom, was fast breaking down. Competitive rents,
competitive prices, competitive wages, were coming in, and the modem capitalist
had already appeared; men who treated land as an investment and agriculture as
a source of profit. The English squire had taken the place of the medieval baron.
A. JOHNSON, THE DIsAPPEARANCE OF THE SMALL LANDOWNER 75 (1963).
70 Sir Edward Coke played an important part in creating an ideological framework
hospitable to economic liberalism. See C. HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH
RZVOLUTION 225-65 (1965). This chapter, by the way, is entitled, "Sir Edward Coke-Myth-
Maker." See also Roberts, supra note 88, at 37-42, for an argument that the "home as
castle" syndrome is rooted in an economic ploy rather than in any modem civil rights
notion.
Coke did not succeed in establishing judicial supremacy in England, although it
appears that he tried. N. DOWLING, CASEs ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 27-29 (4th ed. 1950).
It was Halifax, interestingly enough, who had little use for Coke's approach, and he
employed an early "brooding omnipresence in the sky" argument in the process of ex-
posing the power struggle inherent in their difference. Thus:
Now I would fain know whether the Common Law is capable of being defined,
and whether it doth not hover in the clouds like the prerogative, and bolteth out
like lightening to be made use of for some particular occasion? ....
If the Common Law is supreme, then those who are so who judge what is
the Common Law ....
HA~iFAx, supra note 81, at 197-98. In the United States, of course, the principle of judicial
supremacy triumphed. Interestingly enough, this choice between parliamentary or
judicial supremacy has been seen to be a power struggle:
More concretely, there has been a contest, now greatly prolonged, both in England
and America between those who wanted to establish and perpetuate a lawyers,
constitution and those who have wanted to create a politicians' constitution. In
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masterpiece of 1776, after all, merely crystallized what had coalesced as
the prevailing Weltanschauung during the 1600's.71 In this regard,
moreover, it is instructive to note that the modem law of contracts,
so vital to commerce, had really begun to develop into something suit-
able with Slade's Case72 in 1602.
Society was to undergo yet another convulsion when the Industrial
Revolution exploded upon the scene between 1750 and 1850. 73 The
commerce predicated upon farm products and home industry was to
evolve into a commerce in items manufactured in mills when dispos-
sessed country folk, machines, and entrepreneurial technique were
blended together under the aegis of capitalism. Observe how much
of our tort law had its genesis in this period. It was during these times,
after all, that nitpicking over the distinction between trespass and case
gave way to the evolution of our modem-day law of negligence; witness
the progression from Scott v. Shepherd74 in 1733 to Brown v. Kendall75
in 1850, to say nothing of Winterbottom v. Wright76 in 1842. Indeed,
the law of torts as promulgated by the judges really served to insulate
incipient industry from the costs of the injuries it occasioned its work-
ers or consumers and constituted a disguised subsidy. Thus, whereas
conventional wisdom dictated that government was not to control
commerce, there was nothing wrong with government agencies en-
couraging commerce.
The fact of the matter is that we are living during a period similar
to those identified by Quia Emptores, the Glorious Revolution, and the
Industrial Revolution. While we are apt to think that we will enter
the Technological Epoch when service workers surpass productive work-
ers in numbers, the process really took flight during the Twenties.77
The attempt to do business as usual during the Twenties, i.e., the
England the lawyers set up their constitution at the end of the Glorious Revolu-
tion, only to see the scheme subverted by a rising class of politicians . . .
In the United States the battle ... is being played over again but with the
result still in doubt. The Convention of 1787 copied the English model of 1688
and thereby established . . . the world's foremost example of government by
lawyers.
E. SCHASCHNEMER, PARTY GOvERNmENT 10-11 (1942) (emphasis in original).
71 See 6 W. HoLuswoRTH, A HisfoRY oF ENGLISH LAW 341 (2d ed. 1937).
72 4 Coke 92b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602).
73 Any dates are arbitrary, but a good argument for the ones above is set forth in
H. BEALs, THE INDusTRiAL RzVOLUTION 1750-1850 (1967 ed.). Note also the comment
therein: "The industrial revolution replaced one social system or one civilization by
another." Id. at 30.
74 2 Black. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (C.P. 1773).
75 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
76 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
77 W. RosTow, THE STAGEs oF EcONomc GRowTH 75 (1960).
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failure to recognize that qualitative instead of a quantitative change
was going on, was punished by the Great Depression. Since then we
have managed to replace the ideology of laissez-faire with our current
conventional wisdom. It envisages government and business cooperating
in a consensus-style intellectual milieu to manage the economy so as
to ensure ordered growth and affluence, the last named item at once
ensuring tranquility via material satisfactions and an incentive to keep
the system going via the need for ostentatious consumption.
Interestingly enough, politics have sufficed to make accommoda-
tion possible among government, industry, and labor. Still, if we are
entering a new era, we should expect to see the framework of our
society as radically altered as were societies structured by feudalism and
pre-industrial commercialism when they faded from the scene. Yet, in
this regard, the legislative branch, victorious during the Glorious
Revolution, seems not likely to be the author of necessary structural
changes. Indeed, in our government-business-oriented society, where
bureaucratic planning is done jointly in government agencies and large
corporate research and development departments, the legislators have
been reduced to the role of ombudsmen trying to lead their constituents
through the bureaucratic labyrinth or to protect them against bureau-
cratic overreaching. The Congress now finds its real role in the area
of foreign affairs, where it lately has begun to refight the issue of parlia-
mentary supremacy in a society in which, as a practical matter, the
President has more authority in this field than had George III.7
By a process of elimination, it has been the Court which has had
to re-translate the Constitution in order to readjust the traditional
78 See, e.g., L. HEREN, THE NEw AMERICAN COUMONWEALTH 9 (1968):
Despite all those renowned authorities on medieval history lurking in the
great American universities, I am tempted to press my luck a little further. The
Hundred Years' War was not unlike the unending wars and crisis of the twentieth
century. Edward the Third would have been regarded as a poor king if he had
not gone to war with France, and his victories served him well. . . . Much the
same can be said for the Presidents elected after the Second World War .... In
war, at least while victory was seen to be certain, the medieval king and modem
President have always been supreme.
Note carefully that Heren compares the President not to George III, an early constitu-
tional monarch, but to Edward IIM. The reason he apologized for pressing his luck was
that he also says: "The modem American Presidency can be compared with the British
monarchy as it existed for a century or more after the signing of Magna Carta in 1215."
Id. at 8. And further that "[t]he triumvirate of Monarch, Barons, and Church was no
less real than the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. In fact, the Church was
often more bothersome to the executive than the Court has become." Id. at 5. Indeed,
Heren overdoes it a bit when he suggests that "the modem American Presidency makes
sense as a political system only when it is seen to be a latter-day version of a British
medieval monarchy." Id. Still, there is a frightening increment of truth to his observation
that "Secret Servicemen are beefeaters with crewcuts and button-down shirts." Id. at 7.
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system so that the structure of society might remain viable, albeit new.
The reapportionment cases, after all, simply readjusted the allocation
of legislative authority to reflect the palpable fact that the small town
folk so ably depicted by Norman Rockwell have joined Silas Marner
as a thing of the past in our urbanized society. A great many search
and seizure decisions are simply efforts to immunize the citizen from
the powers of the huge governmental systems that have come into be-
ing in our era. But the Supreme Court has not been working alone.
The law of negligence epitomized during the nineteenth century, for
example, has been replaced by the consumer liability cases of today
that have, in effect, made industry the proprietor of an involuntary
system of social welfare insurance for the victims of accidents attribut-
able to the consumption syndrome.
Still, we are only groping our way through a rolling readjustment of
grundnorms. In a society in which people have so little to say about
the economy, in which unskilled labor is being as ruthlessly eliminated
as were the poor farmers during the various enclosure movements, and
in which affluence has become a status symbol, we must expect to see
develop a right to subsistence. We have, after all, already seen the wel-
fare folk endowed with some rights, but these are only the first steps
in the process. In a society that requires a teacher to have so many
credits in "education" and a librarian a degree in library science, we
must expect "status" to make a neo-feudal reappearance. It should
come as no surprise, therefore, and one may anticipate, that in the
future no one will be subject to deprivation of his "status" without due
process of law, whether he be a college student or a licensed plumber.
The point of all this is that, in the Technological Epoch, decisions
about "rights" have become too complex for the man in the street be-
cause they involve not elementary justice but fundamental decisions
about the very structure of society. Concomitantly, the legislature, melt-
ing pot of executive-business conventional wisdom and collective om-
budsman, has ceased to be the cutting edge of social change. The execu-
tive, arbiter of planning via the bureaucracy and oriented to foreign
affairs, must rely upon uninformed consensus to lay out its claim to
authority. By process of elimination, therefore, the courts have regained
the position of prominence they held when the common law was pro-
mulgated. In short, the judges and the bar are the new establishment.7 9
79 Some readers may protest that lawyers have always been the Establishment. I
don't believe it at all. It should be pointed out that some political scientists have correctly
attributed the unique stability of the American system not so much to the lawyers' Consti-
tution as to the two-party system, which evolved unplanned by the creators of the
Constitution. To capture the Presidency a nation-wide party is necessary, which requires
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To be an establishment, however, the lawyers must be conservative.
Conservatism does not mean adherence to laissez-faire;80 rather it means
a disciplined commitment to channel society along peaceful and just
avenues of evolution.81 It entails at one and the same time a willingness
both parties to attempt to seize the vital center. The mathematics of single-member
electoral districts penalizes third parties. Hence political factors unforeseen by the legalists
have created and have maintained our unique two-party political system and it is this
unwritten political constitution that really counts. This is spelled out in detail in E.
SCHATrCHNEIDER, supra note 70. He also observes that
In effect .. the [two] parties frame the question and define the issue....
Nor is this the only way in which the parties simplify the alternatives .
American government is the most complex in the world, by a very wide margin.
In the theory of American constitutional law the authority of any one public
official, acting alone, is severely restricted, but it would be fantastic to conduct
an election campaign within these limitations. People are not interested in alibis
for non-action, not even when written by constitutional lawyers. They want
results. The truth of the matter is that the American public has never under-
stood the Constitution nor has it ever really believed in it, in spite of the
verbal tradition of constitutionalism. With the rise of a plebiscitary presidency,
making the president the one significant public officer elected by the nation as a
whole, the office has become the vehicle for the expression of a great simplifica-
tion of the Constitution. By a popular political interpretation of the Constitution,
more important than any interpretation ever made by the Supreme Court, the
president is made responsible for the initiation, adoption, and execution of
policies by a mandate that merely ignores every known principle of the separa-
tion of powers and federalism.
Id. at 51-53.
Accepting the theory, however, must cause one to observe that we may be in for
unstable times ahead because the two-party system appears to be in trouble. The three-way
race for mayor of New York City in the autumn of 1969 is merely a microcosmic symptom
of a trend toward three or even four national parties. George Wallace's "third party" may
soon be joined on the left by a fourth party anticipated by Senator Eugene McCarthy
in his TE YEAR oF THE PEOPLE (1969). Interestingly enough, the most recent plan to
replace the Electoral College with a new system of popular election envisages a "winner"
elected by anything more than 40% of that vote. Presumably the House of Representatives
has already anticipated this trend to a multiplicity of parties and candidates.
Thus it is in view of the weakening of the unwritten political matrix of the Republic
that any really significant changes will have to be effectuated through the courts. Lawyers
qua lawyers and not as full-time politicians or apologists for the commercial establishment
will have come into their own again.
80 The lawyers created the matrix in which late nineteenth century laissez-faire
triumphed, but the question remains whether they did so from a perspective of deliberate
detachment or as hired intellectual gunmen. One author suggests that in the later decades
of that century
[t]he majority of the new Court appointees had been influenced greatly by the
propaganda campaign conducted by the American Bar Association in behalf of the
laissez-faire doctrine. The Association, which had been founded in 1878, "became
a sort of juristic sewing circle for mutual education in the gospel of laissez-faire."
R. TpEOLINI, AmcA CONsrrruTioNAL LAW 331 (2d ed. 1965).
81 Whither we are evolving must give us chance to pause. In the universities, for
example, professors are currently wringing their hands because of the rising demand for
open admissions. The current morality, or rather the apparent lack thereof, which en-
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to change, but a refusal to change simply to satisfy transient whims of
society. Interestingly enough, the judges and lawyers, like priests or
conrages sexual promiscuity, up to and including douches flavored to taste, seems to be
a favorite cause for concern. See, e.g., TIME, Dec. 26, 1969, at 51. Still, even the Nixon
Administration seems to have freed itself so much from the traditional Puritan Ethic
that it can approve the principle of a minimum income, work or no work. Indeed, much
that would have been regarded as "radical" is now commonplace news in media attuned
to inventory the commonplace. See, e.g., NEwswEK, Jan. 26, 1970, at 30-47.
These disparate phenomena are merely examples of the many changes going on in
contemporary society. The fact of the change, however, should not upset anyone with sense
enough to realize that the economic impact of our new so-called Technological Era is
bound to force us to create a wholly new civilization, replete with a new Weltanschauung.
True, universities do produce the skilled hands necessary to staff a technological society,
but they also make "busy work" for thousands of juveniles who otherwise would clutter
up the hiring halls. Just as today a high school diploma is a necessity, so tomorrow the
college degree will be mandatory. If, however, we are going to cut the size of the labor
force by postponing entry into it, we must also expect to see earlier and earlier exits via
retirement from it.
Sex? Promiscuity serves a definite social need because it provides a needed release for
the frustrations generated among the intelligent young who realize that they are being
forced to live extended juvenile lives. Concomitantly, sex keeps the labor force busy
turning out totally unutilitarian products demanded solely because they are associated
with media-stimulated sex "needs." Still, the "pill" and the glut of household gadgets have
emancipated the female from drudgery, education has enlightened her, and traditional
morality has declined. Women today are demanding to be treated like men, able not
merely to work at careers but to enjoy the same alleged Rabelaisian freedoms claimed by
the male. Indeed, California seems to be the first state to recognize that marriage is merely
a convenient device to regularize sex on a temporary basis. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1970, at 14,
cols. 7-8. These several phenomena may yet coalesce so that we may soon see sexual
intercourse become an accepted informal pastime of unattached people busy "doing their
own thing," while the serious business of procreation becomes regulated by the State.
Marriages of four or five years, communal nurseries, genetic surgery, abortion, euthanasia,
etc., may yet become the accepted norms. We need not rush to our Plato but can stop with
Holmes, who observed succinctly that
I believe that the wholesale social regeneration which so many now seem to expect,
if it can be helped by conscious, coordinated human effort, cannot be affected
appreciably by tinkering with the institution of property, but only by taking in
hand life and trying to build a race.
0. W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAP'ERs 306 (1920).
Perceptive people have for years appreciated that Western (including Russian) society
must evolve wholly new forms. Indeed, the current interest in drugs is merely a symptom
of the felt need of individuals to reacquire a sense of meaning. It was Nietzsche, after all,
who insisted that only as an aesthetic phenomenon is the world ever justified.
More interesting, however, is that this new need for identity is the mirror image of
the threat to the environment, and that both represent the social costs of urbanization.
Thus Arnold Toynbee has warned us that:
The problem. ., in Megalopolis is the problem of how to rehumanize life when
it has to be lived in a man-made infinity of people, buildings and streets. Mega-
lopolis is going to encompass the earth . ..
Liberation from it will have to be sought by turning inwards from the
physical world to the psyche and to the ultimate spiritual presence that is "the
dweller in the innermost" besides being the creator and sustainer of the universe.
CrrEs or DESnINY 27 (A. Toynbee ed. 1967).
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commissars, must serve as the enlightened skeleton of the society, assur-
ing popular participation in the everyday affairs of the society but
assuming the responsibility to make, behind the scenes, the decisions
crucial to the evolution of society over the long range. Lawyers have
been the commissars of capitalism, and like their communist counter-
parts, they have been blindly captivated by ideological nonsense actually
detrimental to their ultimate vision of society. Both "capitalist" and
"communist" societies are in need of a priesthood cognizant of the real
issues facing society and willing to decide them even though, to an
extent, they must be hypocritical in the process. In short, notwithstand-
ing democratic dogma, we still live in the age of Dostoyevsky's Grand
Inquisitor.82
V
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The danger in responding promptly to the clarion call for a sym-
posium on anything as "in" as environment now appears to be is that
one's contribution will -be overtaken by events before the symposium
hits the academic newsstands. Such indeed has been the case here, which
explains the obvious addition of this section to what has gone before.
The New York Court of Appeals has recently had the chance to
consider the controversy presented by Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.P3
By a four to one decision, two judges not participating, the court
decided that, notwithstanding the characterization of the offending
cement plant as a nuisance, the neighbors must content themselves
82 F. DOSTOYEVSKY, THE. BROTHERs KARAMAZOV, Book V, ch. 5 (Mod. L. ed. 1950).
The cold cunning of Dostoyevsky's inquisitor may prove to be "a bit much" for
American readers who are apt to prefer the uplift approach to civic problems. Indeed,
"environment" has become such a common topic these days that it almost promises to
become a bore. Indeed, we seem to be witness to the phenomenon described by Professor
Schattschneider, supra note 70, wherein the two-party system serves to reduce complex
problems to simple either/or choices. Thus a recent Associated Press dispatch, quoting a
key administration official, reported that "the party that writes the best environment
record is 'going to be the party that wins the most elections."' The Ithaca Journal, Jan.
28, 1970, at 1, col. 6. NavswrFx, Jan. 26, 1970, at 84, confirms that the politicians have
recognized the "political potential of pollution." It is irrelevant which party's candidate
reaches the top of the greasy pole in 1972 since any foreseeable candidate will be con-
tending for the office in terms of an intellectual framework that categorizes the problem
as one of reform. The danger is that the politicalization of the problem in terms of reform
may obscure the need, not to deal with some details of Keynesian welfare capitalism, but
to face the ultimate need to recast the whole structure of society into a posture responsive
to the needs of the twenty-first century.
83 - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1970). See text at notes 2-29 supra.
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with a money judgment as compensation for the diminution in values
of their properties. In the process the old decision in Whalen v. Union
Bag & Paper Co.,84 which purported to mandate an injunction in
nuisance cases whenever the harm was not insubstantial, had to be
overruled. It is now official, therefore, that New York has adopted the
rule laid down years ago in Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper &
Iron Co.85
If this were England, where precise holdings of courts are sacro-
sanct, the decision might be very interesting. This is the United States,
however, where rules must be read along with the facts of both the
case and the socio-economic environment before any conclusions may
be drawn. Indeed, if Whalen was still seriously regarded as "law" in
New York, how does one explain the sorry environment that is Buf-
falo? Presumably New York courts have not found many industrial
activities actually to have been nuisances, which would be quite pos-
sible so long as nuisance law was oriented around the fault principle.8 6
Then again, it may have been the rule in New York that, nuisance be
damned, injunctive relief will not be granted if the area is zoned to
permit the use to which the defendant has put his property.87 Whether
New York now has repudiated the fault theory of nuisance along with
the zoning law defense to injunction suits are questions, unfortunately,
to which the Boomer decision does not address itself.
Having resurrected Whalen as something of a straw-man to de-
molish, the majority opinion questions whether, barring an injunction,
permanent damages can be awarded in lieu of allowing plaintiffs
periodically to sue for the diminution in the rental value of their
parcels. True enough, other courts have discussed whether, on partic-
ular facts, one option is more appropriate than the other."" The Court
of Appeals, however, seems to have been concerned whether the op-
tion existed to impose permanent damages. Concluding that the option
existed, the opinion then supports its conclusion by analogizing this
to an imposition of a servitude on plaintiff's land for which the value
must be paid. 9
New York has explicitly recognized, therefore, that the pollution
inflicted by the cement company was tantamount to "taking" a servi-
84 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
85 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904). See text at notes 27-29 supra.
88 E.g., Bove v. Donner Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (4th
Dep't 1932).
87 See text at notes 19-20 supra.
88 E.g., Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 4 N.W.2d 435 (1942).
89 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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tude to lay dust and send noise over the neighboring fees. In short,
nuisance law partakes of the exercise of a power of private eminent
domainl Needless to say, Judge Jasen in his dissent pointed out the
absence of any public use or purpose which would justify the exercise
of governmental power to condemn the land, much less a private
company actually engaged in polluting the neighboring environment.90
If one is left somewhat bewildered that New York's highest court
could at this late date accept Whalen as good law, an even more crucial
question raised by the case should be considered. Given the validity of
Whalen, why would the court decide to overrule it in the midst of an
environmental crisis? The timing of the decision is incredible. Charity
may incline one to conclude that the result was verbalized in terms of
Whalen, a false issue, simply because a majority had not yet agreed
upon how definitively to restructure the local law of nuisance into a
contemporary mold. Frankly, such a conclusion would require the
charitable proclivities of a saint.
Manifestly, the majority was not blind to the pollution problem.
Interestingly enough, the court chose this opportunity to invoke a
litany in behalf of judicial restraint. That is, so complex is the problem
of solving the environmental crisis, the legislature is the appropriate
forum in which to hammer out the solutions; complex polity cannot
be made simply as the by-product of lawsuits between private parties.
This is true. Lawsuits which, after all, only decide who won and who
lost, after the fashion of a feeble computer programmed in binary
logic only to respond with either "0" or "1," are not apt forums in
which to hammer out broad and complex programs of social reform.
Lawsuits do not hold forth the promise of any immediate solution to
the environmental mess into which we have gotten ourselves.
Although lawsuits are not likely to undo the mess we are in, they
could, however, serve as the basis for what amounts to a containment
policy to make sure that in the unspoiled areas of the countryside we
do not repeat the mistakes of the past. Is there anyone, who now, given
the benefit of hindsight, applauds the result reached in Madison? Is
anyone willing to apply that style of reasoning to an oil line across
Alaska, an oil field off Santa Barbara, or a jet airport in the Everglades?
True enough, these questions may be rhetorical, but they do illustrate
the mood of the times. Still, the Court of Appeals has decided in
Boomer that the times are propitious to ratify the Madison doctrine.
Whether we can solve the environmental crisis remains to be
seen, because we have not actually tested by the ballot box whether
90 - N.Y. 2d at -, - N.E.2d at -, - N.YS.2d at - (dissenting opinion).
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the public is actually willing to pay the price for solution. Presumably,
however, rational creatures would implement a containment policy
so that things do not actually become worse. In its perverse way,
Boomer illustrates the need for a Supreme Court declaration of a
constitutional right to an environment capable of sustaining decent
human life. Given decisions as incredibly unresponsive as Boomer,
there is an urgent need to guarantee on the constitutional level pro-
tection of individual rights in the environment before demagogues
persuade people that they will have to perfect this right outside the
system.
APPENDIX
DISSENTING OPINION OF COMMISSIONER WILLIAM M. BENNETT IN CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION-oN APPLICATION BY PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC
COMPANY FOR A NucLEAR PLANT AT DIABLO CANYON (1968).
I would grant rehearing.
Any reliance upon this agency to preserve a dwindling coastline is
entirely misplaced. Nothing has been learned from the experience at
Bodega Bay where the pleas of conservationists as well as those concerned
with the public safety were rejected by this Commission. Only when the
Atomic Energy Commission expressed the opinion that the site was un-
safe did the Pacific Gas and Electric Company give up its plans for [the]
nuclear plant at Bodega Bay.
Californians should become concerned and angry at the cavalier treat-
ment which today's decision signifies. This proceeding is part of the conflict
between those interests such as the Pacific Gas and Electric Company which
sees the waters, the continental shelf, the beaches and the uplands as natural
resources to be exploited regardless of the destruction of landscape or dis-
ruption of the ecology which may ensue, and those such as myself who view
the coastal region as a grand and varied natural wonder of great recreational
value which must be held in its natural condition. Not once has this agency
resolved this conflict in favor of the preservation of the natural condition.
Looking to the Pacific Gas and Electric Company for the slightest
indication of concern for the recreational needs of the people of the State
of California is fruitless. Pacific Gas and Electric Company demonstrates
planning which is cold in concept and ruthless in application so far as
nature is concerned. And if Californians are under the illusion that some-
how utility planning is going to save for them a state which is true and
beautiful they need only look to the California landscape at present which
is dotted and blighted with an endless string of utility poles. This is public
utility planning and this is public utility apathy toward conservation.
That the shoreline is dwindling is beyond argument. And that these
resources belong to all generations and that it is the duty of the present
generation to save such resources does not seem to me to be the subject of
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argument. But when there is taken into account the authorized offshore
drilling by the Federal Government as was recently the case in connection
with the Santa Barbara Channel, when there is considered the shoreline
already given to commercial use such as oil drilling, the billboard smear
of beach land, the steam generating plants of utilities and beach land now
not accessible to public use for other reasons, then it can be seen that in
California in 1968 there is really not that much remaining to protect.
The public interest was not represented in this proceeding by the
Commission staff which made no survey of other suitable sites and which
long ago and now should be locating that type of place where there should
be placed all nuclear plants of all California public utilities once and for
all. Let the public not be misled into the belief that its right to preservation
of that which is natural is fully explored in proceedings such as this or is
fought for by an active and aggressive staff participation. It is not!
There should be a moratorium on the placing of such plants until the
California Comprehensive Ocean Area Plan becomes meaningful. Whether
the present state administration has any interest in such a plan is certainly
speculative but at least until it is clear that there is no concern for such
matters, plants such as this should be directed toward the least suitable loca-
tion upon the California shoreline as at Morro Bay or in the alternative
denied. I would point out that I have seen Diablo Canyon. Only one such
canyon is Diablo. Before any judgment permitting its destructioii can be
made all members of this Commission should have v¢isited the site to make
their own conclusions as to the contest between beauty and energy. ... It
is beyond argument that Pacific Gas and Electric Company has available to
it other sites along the California shore where a plant such as here proposed
could easily be placed. Morro Bay comes quickly to mind. Anyone reading
the sorry history of Pacific Gas and Electric Company at Morro Bay should
become appalled and indignant at the devastation utility engineering and
construction has wrought upon that community-unless, of course, one is
indifferent to such matters as aesthetics. As one who remembers Morro Bay
before the intrusion of Pacific Gas and Electric Company upon that com-
munity only memory restores what was once an area of beauty, not domi-
nated by towering stacks and free of the tangled web of utility towers and
power lines. And more importantly to the people of Morro Bay also free
from air pollution. Californians should realize that the Pacific Gas and
Electric Company before its arrival at Morro Bay was quick to reassure
the people of Morro Bay that the plant would be a welcome addition, an
assistance to county revenue requirements and a thing of civic pride. No
question of air pollution was raised until that inevitable day when the
community of Morro Bay became alarmed at the problems of air pollution
caused by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company plant.
Since the Pacific Gas and Electric Company has already made a per-
manent change and permanent damage at Morro Bay it would in my judg-
ment be a far better thing to place that nuclear plant upon property which
Pacific Gas and Electric Company presently holds at Morro Bay. But nol
With its almost magnetic attraction for the untouched site, the clean sand
and the blue water, Pacific Gas and Electric Company selects a hitherto
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inviolate area, applies the blade of the bulldozer to it and then come
tumbling down the ferns, the glens, the trees, the valley.
Californians should also be aware that the Sierra Club has no official
position with reference to the placing of nuclear plants along California's
shoreline. There is a popular myth that that great organization devoted to
conservation is in some way the public watchdog in matters such as here.
Unfortunately neither'in the Bodega Bay controversy nor in the Diablo
Canyon controversy has the Sierra Club come forth to present the -conser-
vation position. This is not only surprising but it is disappointing. Un-
doubtedly the Sierra Club or at least its decision-making members were
educated by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company so that any original
notion of incompatibility between a nuclear plant and Diablo Canyon
was dispelled. One wonders how that great organization can ever elect now
to defend against utility intrusion a future nuclear plant site. Regardless of
the wonder, however, this Commissioner would hope that the Sierra Club
would begin to make a spirited fight for the present generation, for future
generations, for my children and yours and for their absolute right to places
of beauty and recreation. I would suggest to the Sierra Club that the public
utilities of California have other plans for other sites along the California
coastline. I suggest to the Sierra Club and to other Californians that in the
future the Pacific Gas and Electric Company will return to Bodega Bay.
The date of arrival will be some time after December 31, 1968.
I would grant rehearing and would direct Pacific Gas and Electric Com-
pany to come forward with other plans for the location of a nuclear plant-
but not at Diablo Canyon.
